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Sammanfattning 
Nya infektiösa sjukdomar är ett återkommande hot mot hälsan hos både djur och människor. 
Förståelse för hur nya sjukdomar uppkommer är viktigt för att bättre förutse källor till nya 
utbrott. Listan på bidragande faktorer är lång, en blandning av antropogeniska effekter, 
miljöförändringar, molekylära och klimatiska förändringar är alla involverade i uppkomsten 
och spridningen av dessa sjukdomar. Två av de underliggande faktorerna får särskild 
uppmärksamhet i den här studien. Spridning av sjukdomar från vilda djur till tamdjur och 
zoonoser som sprids från djur till människa är centrala fenomen i uppkomsten av nya infektiösa 
sjukdomar bland både tamdjur och människor. Den här studien analyserar hur afrikansk 
svinpest sprids från vilda till tamsvin, och agerar därmed som modell för hur nya sjukdomar 
uppkommer. Fältarbetet sker i norra delarna av Uganda, ett land som är en ’hot spot’ för nya 
virussjukdomar. 
Afrikansk svinpest spreds nyligen till Georgien, Ryssland och Ukraina, och har därmed hamnat 
i fokus som ett hot mot djurhälsan i hela Europa. Det är en mycket smittsam hemorrhagisk 
virussjukdom som tillhör familjen Asfaviridae. Sjukdomen kan smitta en rad olika svindjur, 
däribland vårtsvin (Phacochoerus aethiopicus och Phacochoerus africanus), busksvin 
(Potamochoerus larvatus), skogssvin (Hylochoerus meinertzhageni), samt tamsvin och vildsvin 
(båda Sus scrofa). Mjuka fästingar av arten Ornithodoros agerar som vektorer för sjukdomen 
och sprider den till svinddjur i en sylvatisk cykel. Blodprover togs från 91 tamsvin, och 
fästingar samlades in från 6 vårtsvinsgryt i Murchinson Falls national park. Dessa analyserades 
med real-time PCR för att hitta ASF virus. Alla blodprover från fästingar var PCR-negativa för 
ASF. Den här studien fann ett tamsvin som var infekterat med afrikansk svinpest i PCR analys, 
men den var negativ för antikroppar i ELISA. Detta är en intressant fynd, eftersom det 
möjliggör spridning från en asymptomatisk bärare till andra tamsvin, och kan vara en källa till 
nya utbrott. Sekvensering och nucleotide Blast analys fann att viruset var 100% identiskt med 
genotyp IX som tidigare har hittats i Uganda. 
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Abstract 
Emerging infectious diseases are a recurring threat to both human and animal health. 
Understanding the multiple causes behind the emergence of new diseases is key to the 
prevention of new and potentially devastating outbreaks. The list of underlying causes is long, 
including a variety of anthropogenic, environmental, molecular and climatic changes that 
promote the emergence and spread of disease. Two of these factors are central to the 
emergence of new diseases and receive special attention in this study. The spread of disease 
from wildlife to livestock and diseases that spread from animals to humans (zoonoses) are of 
importance as they implicated in the majority of EID events. This study aims to analyse how 
one emerging infectious disease (ASF) spreads between different wild and domestic hosts, and 
thereby provide a model for how disease emergence may occur. The field study is located in 
the northern parts of Uganda, a hotspot new and emerging viral diseases.  
The recent spread of African swine fever to parts of Georgia, Russia and most recently to the 
Ukraine, has put this disease in the spotlight as a new and emerging threat to animal health in 
all of Europe. African swine fever is a highly contagious viral hemorrhagic disease of pigs, the 
causal agent of which is a double stranded DNA virus belonging to the family Asfaviridae. The 
disease is capable of infecting a number of suids, including warthogs (Phacochoerus 
aethiopicus and Phacochoerus africanus), bushpigs (Potamochoerus larvatus), the giant forest 
hog (Hylochoerus meinertzhageni), as well as the European wild boar and domestic pigs (both 
Sus scrofa). Soft ticks (genus Ornithodoros) act as vectors for the disease, spreading it to suid 
hosts in a sylvatic cycle. 91 blood samples were collected from domestic pigs. Engorged ticks 
were collected from 6 warthog dens. These were analysed using real-time PCR for the presence 
of ASFV. All blood samples extracted from ticks were PCR negative for the virus. This study 
found one domestic pig that was PCR positive for ASFV, but negative for ASFV antibodies 
when run on an ELISA. This is an interesting find as it suggests the presence of asymptomatic 
carriers among domestic pigs, a possible source of new outbreaks. Sequencing of the viral 
DNA and nucleotide Blast analysis found the virus to be 100% identical to genotype IX which 
has previously been found to circulate in Uganda. 
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Introduction
Infectious diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms such as viruses, bacteria or 
parasites, which are capable of being transmitted from one individual to another. Non-
infectious diseases comprise all other diseases, such as cancer, auto-immune disease, or genetic 
disease. An emerging infectious disease (EID) is a disease that has recently been discovered 
(for example HIV, SARS), has crossed the species barrier (Ebola, Nipah virus), or is a well-
known disease that has recently increased in incidence or geographical range (West Nile virus, 
African swine fever) (Morse 1995, Daszak et. al 2001). There are also re-emerging infectious 
diseases, such as antibiotic-resistant strains of tuberculosis, or chloroquine-resistant malaria, 
that have existed for a long time but recently evolved to become more virulent and less 
treatable with current medicines.  
For most EIDs there are no effective therapies, vaccines, or preventative strategies to combat 
the disease. In addition, there is a poor understanding of the factors underlying their emergence 
(Wolfe, 2005). In order to better predict when and where a new EID event will occur, research 
is required to understand the driving mechanisms behind disease emergence. This study uses 
the interface between bushpigs, warthogs, ticks and domestic pigs in northern Uganda to 
analyse the complex interactions between human behaviour, agricultural practices, ecology and 
viral epidemiology to determine the causes of disease emergence.  
Factors in the emergence of infectious disease 
In recent years much attention has been paid to EIDs that have the potential to cause global 
pandemics. These include the SARS outbreak in 2002, the H5N1 “bird flu” epidemic, the 
“swine flu” pandemic in 2009, and most recently the West Nile virus epidemic in the United 
States. EIDs that cause panzootics in animals or wildlife tend to be less publicised but are of 
equal importance. They impact animal health, have economic repercussions, and affect 
biodiversity through the endangerment and extinction of species (Smith et. al, 2006). The 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom in 2001 is a good example. 
Although not directly harmful to human health, it led to the culling of millions of head of 
cattle, sheep and goats, and cost the British economy several billion pounds in agriculture and 
lost tourism (Barclay, 2001). EIDs have also been responsible for 4% of all species extinctions 
and 8% of species endangerment (Smith et. al, 2006). This is well exemplified by the 
endangered African wild dog, currently under threat from rabies and canine distemper virus in 
east Africa (Cleaveland et. al, 2000).  
The trend in infectious diseases shows a steady increase from the 1940’s to the present day 
(Jones et. al, 2008). There was a peak incidence in the 1980’s that coincided with the start of 
the global HIV pandemic. The estimated rise in EID events during recent decades is not the 
result of increased reporting due to better surveillance, as the trend is increasing even when 
reporting bias has been accounted for (Jones et. al, 2008).  
Research into the mechanisms driving disease emergence has highlighted several contributing 
factors. As would be expected, the underlying causes are numerous and complex, reflecting the 
variety of individual EID cases. One aspect they all appear to have in common is that 
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anthropogenic change is usually involved. Many EIDs have their origins in wildlife, from 
where they spread to domestic animals and on to humans. Examples include Ebola virus, which 
emerged in Uganda in the 1930’s from a suspected bat reservoir in the wild. Factors 
contributing to EIDs from wildlife can be traced to habitat fragmentation, human encroachment 
on wildlife reservoirs, increased population density of wildlife, pathogens, and host, as well as 
land clearance and changes in agricultural practices. Each of these contributes to creating an 
interface over which infection with new diseases may occur (Morse, 1995).  
In other cases, it may be the susceptibility to disease in the recipient that allows pathogens to 
spread beyond their usual range. Factors such as breakdown of public health, poverty, war and 
famine can contribute to creating conditions within the human population that allows pathogens 
to thrive. For example, the peak in EIDs in the 1980’s coincided with the HIV pandemic, as the 
large proportion of immunosuppressed individuals worldwide allowed other diseases, such as 
tuberculosis, to increase in prevalence (Jones et. al, 2008). Other factors may facilitate the 
spread of disease on a local and global scale, once it has become established in a population. 
An example is the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003, which was close to becoming a 
global pandemic as international travel allowed the disease to spread to more than two dozen 
countries worldwide (CDC, 2012). Factors such as increased population density, urbanization, 
globalisation, modern transport and tourism, and local and global trade all allow an EID to 
spread at a faster pace than ever before. Climate change may also play role in increasing the 
spread of a disease, although the effects of changing temperature and rainfall is difficult to 
predict. It is possible that increased temperature will spread vectors such as ticks and 
mosquitoes over a larger geographical range, thereby contributing to the spread of vector-borne 
pathogens (Morse, 1995).  
The case of re-emerging diseases is directly the result of human behaviour, as the unrestricted 
use of medicines and antibiotics has lead to microbial adaptation to resist treatment (Davis et. 
al, 2001). Of all the factors involved in driving disease emergence, the most important appears 
to be anthropogenically induced change. In this light, EIDs can be seen as an unwanted side-
effect of human economic development (Jones et. al, 2008).   
Zoonotic EIDs 
Zoonoses are diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans and vice versa. Of all 
the diseases that affect humans, around half are zoonotic and have historically originated in 
animals (868 pathogenic agents, 61% of the total) (Taylor et. al, 2001). Zoonoses also make up 
a majority of EIDs, as two thirds of all EIDs can be traced to an animal origin. These include 
SARS, HIV, Nipah virus, Ebola, and Hantaviruses (Taylor et. al, 2001). Evidence suggests that 
viral transfer from animal to human is fairly common, but onward transmission from human to 
human is relatively rare. This is evident in the bushmeat trade, where hunters in Cameroon are 
regularly infected with simian foamy viruses, without further human-to-human transmission 
occurring (Wolfe, 2004). The very close interface with wild animals provides a platform where 
the disease can be transmitted to humans, but as the viruses do not yet have the means for 
onward transmission and therefore no outbreak occurs. Several viruses, including avian 
influenza and hendra viruses, appear to follow a similar pattern, transmitting to humans 
sporadically without further human-to-human transmission occurring. This process has been 
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called “viral chatter”, a mechanism that may be fundamental to viral EIDs (Wolfe, 2005). High 
rates of viral chatter increases the pathogens diversity and variation, and thereby increases the 
probability that one version of the virus will finally be able to replicate in humans. Monkeypox 
and Nipah viruses have reached the second stage, acquiring a minor ability to spread between 
humans, with small epidemics of limited human-to-human transmission (Wolfe, 2005). 
Of the viruses that do manage to transmit between humans, most tend to do so at rates that are 
too low to allow the pathogen to become permanently established in the human population. 
Research into DNA sequences of HIV suggests that as many as 10 transmission events into the 
human population occurred before the virus attained rates of transmission that allowed it to 
become permanently established (Hahn et. al, 2000). On a molecular level, there are numerous 
barriers hindering animal diseases from infecting a human host. In order for a pathogen to cross 
the species barrier, it must first enter the host cell, replicate with the assistance of the foreign 
cell, evade the host immune response, exit the cell and then be able to infect other organisms. 
For each of these steps, a mutation is required in the pathogen to allow it to adapt to a foreign 
host. Most zoonotic viruses are RNA viruses, as these have a greater tendency to mutate during 
the replication process through point mutations, genetic drift or antigenic shift. DNA viruses, 
such as African swine fever, have better proof-reading mechanisms that remove unwanted 
mutations and therefore are less likely to mutate. Of all the RNA viruses that have achieved the 
feat of infecting humans, only HIV, H3N2 and H1N1 influenza A viruses achieved human-to-
human transmission and are now permanently circulating in the human population (Webby et. 
al, 2004). 
EIDs from Wildlife 
The majority (71.8%) of zoonotic EIDs have an origin in wildlife (Jones et. al, 2008). Research 
shows that wildlife diversity and species richness is a determining factor for the appearance of 
zoonotic EIDs (Jones et. al. 2008,  Wolfe 2005). Species diversity and richness can be plotted 
along a gradient that increases towards the equator. It is as yet unclear whether it is the 
diversity of pathogens or their wildlife hosts that is the driving force in the appearance of 
wildlife EIDs; perhaps it is a combination of the two. As species richness is a key in the 
designation of EID “hot-spots”, there should be an increase in surveillance and preparedness 
for EID events in lower latitudes (fig. 1). However, current research shows that EID research 
and surveillance is focused on higher latitudes, where EIDs are least likely to emerge (Jones et. 
al, 2008). 
  
Figure 1. Global distribution of the relative risk of a zoonotic EID event from wildlife (left) and vector 
borne pathogens (right) (Jones et. al, 2008, image reprinted with the consent of Nature Publishing Group). 
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Along with species diversity, anthropogenic factors can contribute to diseases spreading from 
wildlife and causing outbreaks in domestic animals and humans. Nipah and Hendra viruses are 
two paramyxoviruses that followed this path. They emerged from pteropid fruit bat reservoirs 
in Malaysia in 1999 and Australia in 1994. The spread to humans occurred after amplification 
in domestic animal hosts, Nipah virus first spread to domestic pigs, and Hendra virus spread to 
horses. The emergence of Nipah virus can be explained through deforestation and agricultural 
expansion. The growth of intensive pig farming and the practice of having fruit orchards 
surrounding pig farms brought bats urine, faeces and partly eaten fruit in contact with domestic 
pigs (Daszak et. al, 2006). Nipah-virus infected bats have always been present in Malaysia, but 
the human-induced change in their environment caused it to emerge in domestic animals and 
thereafter spreading to humans. The outbreak led to the culling of 1 million pigs in Malaysia. 
To avoid future outbreaks, increase biosecurity on pig farms and controls over trade in live pigs 
is required, along with increased surveillance in high-risk areas, and buffer zones around farms. 
Hendra virus followed a similar path, spreading from pteropid fruit bats to horses and then 
humans. It is believed that land clearance of lowland eucalyptus woodland brought fruit bats to 
fruiting trees in suburban gardens. The increased bat population density in these areas made 
contact between bat urine and horses more likely (Daszak et. al, 2006) SARS coronavirus had a 
similar human-wildlife interface. The outbreak in 2002 was traced to the farming of wild palm 
civets, and selling and live, subclinically infected civets at local markets. This brought humans 
and civets into close contact, facilitating disease transmission. Phylogenetic analysis confirmed 
that the virus originated in bats, then spread to humans via palm civets as an amplifier host. 
The outbreak lead to 10,000 palm civets being destroyed in Guangdong province, China.  
Another wildlife-human interface that has lead to the emergence of disease is the bushmeat 
trade in Africa. The bushmeat trade has been responsible for the emergence of Ebola, HIV-1 
and -2, and possibly anthrax and simian foamy viruses (Wolfe, 2005). The butchering, 
transportation, sale, purchase, and eating of wild animals creates ideal conditions for 
pathogenic transfer. There is a high demand for bushmeat in west and central Africa, an 
estimated 300 grams of bushmeat per person per day is consumed in the Congo basin. This 
amounts to 4.5 million tons of bushmeat being taken out of the forest annually (Wolfe, 2005). 
In Uganda, and specifically in the study area for this project, there is anecdotal evidence that 
illegal hunting takes place in Murchinson falls national park. Studies have also shown that 
bushmeat hunting occurs in the southern parts of Murchinson falls national park, and although 
the amount of poaching taking place is relatively low, both bushpigs and warthogs are included 
in the species hunted for food (Oluput, 2009). This creates the conditions necessary for the 
spread of African swine fever from the confines of the reserve to domesticated pigs living in 
the periphery. In the areas surrounding the park bushpigs may also be hunted legally, and taken 
to local communities to be sold or eaten. Thereby interface is created between wildlife and 
domestic animals as the latter come into contact with meat, skins or offal from carcasses 
infected with the virus. As meat products remain infective for several months after slaughter, 
there is a high risk of infection at this potential interface.  
Human demographics may put pressure on the nature reserves and bring people into contact 
with wildlife. A recent study on the effect of migration on protected areas in Uganda, found 
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that 72% of those who engage in hunting in protected areas (in this case Budongo Forest 
Reserve, Masindi district, Uganda) were regional migrants. Results of the study also showed 
that regional migrants were more likely to be associated with deforestation than local 
inhabitants (Zommers et. al, 2011). The conflict that has affected northern Uganda between 
1987 to 2006 has displaced up to two million people (WHO, 2005). As these people have 
begun to return home there is a risk that lack of jobs will induce people to turn to hunting and 
deforestation to earn a living, which could exacerbate the problem. Examples of this in past 
include arboviruses such as dengue and yellow fever, as well as cutaneous leishmaniasis, that 
have all emerged as a direct result of encroachment on wildlife habitats (Wolfe, 2005).  
African swine fever 
African swine fever is an EID that has its origin in wildlife. It is a highly contagious disease 
among domestic pigs, and has a very high mortality rate (approaching 100%) (OIE, 2009). It is 
endemic in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and Sardinia, with sporadic outbreaks 
occurring in the rest of the world (fig. 2). 
African swine fever is caused by a double-stranded DNA virus that is the only member of the 
Asfarviridae family. The virus infects warthogs (Phacochoerus aethiopicus and Phacochoerus 
africanus), bushpigs (Potamochoerus larvatus), wild boar (Sus scrofa), the giant forest hog 
(Hylochoerus meinertzhageni), domestic pigs, and soft ticks (genus Ornithodoros). The ticks 
act as vectors, spreading the disease within and between different species in a sylvatic cycle. 
 
          Figure 2. World distribution map of African swine fever 2010 (OIE WAHID). 
When infected with the most virulent form of the virus, domestic pigs can rapidly deteriorate 
with death occurring within two weeks of contracting the disease (OIE, 2009). It is one of the 
most serious diseases of domestic pigs, with very high mortality rates and potential for 
international spread, which puts it on the list of notifiable diseases by the OIE. Symptoms in 
infected pigs include high fever (40-42◦C), anorexia, cyanotic skin on ears and extremities, 
bleeding from bodily orifices and eventually coma and death. The route of viral infection is 
usually via the tonsils or the dorsal pharyngeal mucosa to the mandibular or retropharyngeal 
lymph nodes, thereafter the virus spreads to other body organs via a viraemia. A primary 
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viraemia occurs within a few hours of infection, followed by a second viraemia within 24 
hours. The liver, spleen, lungs and lymph nodes are the main sites of secondary viral infection, 
but all tissues of the body normally become infected within a few days. The haemorrhage and 
disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) that lead to death and typical post-mortem 
findings is the result of viral replication in endothelial cells of the capillaries. The virus also 
replicates in monocytes and macrophages, thereby affecting the pig’s immune system and 
impairs the coagulation of blood through release of cytokines and complement factors (Penrith 
et al, 2004). 
A subacute, chronic form of the virus exists in endemic areas, and with less virulent strains of 
the virus. The subacute form has lower mortality rates, with symptoms of undulating fever and 
sporadic abortions. Pigs that survive can develop a chronic subclinical infection, with the 
potential of infecting others (OIE, 2009). Pathogenesis of the disease and pig immune 
responses are still poorly understood. Antibodies do not protect against infection, but can 
confer some degree of protection against identical viral strains in individuals that have survived 
the original infection (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et. al, 2009). 
Warthogs and bushpigs do not show any signs of clinical disease when infected, and mortalities 
are rare (Bastos et. al, 2009). Warthogs constitute the main mammalian reservoir of the disease 
in the wild, consisting of asymptomatic carriers among young warthogs, who spread the 
disease onwards via the ticks that feed on them.  
Wild boar in Europe and parts of Africa can also become infected. They show clinical 
symptoms identical with those of domestic pigs (severe, unspecific clinical signs with fever, 
depression, anorexia, dyspnea, ataxia), and succumb to the disease with similar mortality rates 
(100%)(Blome et. al, 2012). This is especially true with the highly virulent strains circulating 
in the Caucasus, where studies find no chronic ASF carriers among the wild boar population 
(Blome et. al, 2012). Wild boar are likely to become infected through spill-over from domestic 
pigs, exposure to pig carcasses or contact with fomites, or consumption of contaminated feed.   
The spread of ASF 
ASF first appeared in Kenya in the 1920’s as domestic pigs were brought to the country by 
foreign explorers. It was identified as a virus originating in subclinically infected warthogs in 
1921, when it was noted that pigs became infected when they came in close contact with 
wildlife (Costard et. al, 2009). The disease spread through domestic pig populations in Central 
and West Africa and reached Madagascar in 1998 and Mauritius in 2007.  
ASF first spread outside Africa in 1957 when it appeared in Portugal. A further outbreak 
appeared in Portugal in 1960, and although efforts were made to eradicate the disease, it 
remained endemic on the Iberian peninsula until the late 1990’s. It was found that European 
ticks of the Ornithodoros genus were capable of acting as vectors for the disease, thus 
complicating efforts at eradication. After its introduction to the European continent in 1957, the 
disease appeared in numerous European countries in the following years. Cases appeared in 
Malta, Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands during the 1970’s and 80’s (Costard et. al, 
2009). Europe is now free from ASF following a concerted eradication program, but it is still 
endemic in Sardinia. Spread of ASF has also occurred beyond the continent of Europe. In 
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1970’s, outbreaks appeared in Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Brazil (Costard et. al, 
2009). Worldwide eradication efforts have largely been successful in countries where ASF 
outbreaks have occurred. This has been achieved through effective surveillance measures and 
stamping out programs to contain the disease where outbreaks occurred.  
The most recent outbreak in Europe occurred in 2007 when cases were found in Georgia, 
which eventually spread to neighbouring countries including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and 
the Caucasus (Beltrán-Alcrudo et. al, 2008)(fig. 3). ASF is now endemic in Russia, and 
300,000 pigs have been culled as a result of ASF outbreaks at a cost of an estimated $240 
million (FAO, 2012). In July of 2012 the virus spread to the Ukraine, probably from imported 
meat products from neighbouring Russia. The first case in the Ukraine was 170km from the 
Russian border, increasing the likelihood that the virus spread via live infected pigs or 
contaminated goods that were transported into the country, and not by direct contact between 
swine or wild boar (Roberts, 2012). The arrival of the disease to the Ukraine has increased the 
risk to neighbouring countries such as Moldova, Belarus, Romania and the Baltic states to the 
west. To the east, cases have  appeared along the border with Kazakhstan, a country that shares 
a long border with China. Should the disease spread eastward, it could threaten China’s 1 
billion strong pig population. China is already at risk from its growing trade with African 
nations, and the virus may spread directly to the country via this route (Callaway, 2012). 
 
Figure 3. The recent outbreak and spread of African Swine Fever across 
Russia and Eastern Europe (Callaway, 2012, image reprinted with the 
consent of Nature Publishing Group) 
Contingency plans have been put in place to hinder the spread of the disease in Eastern Europe 
and the European Union. This includes banning all imports of live pigs and pork products to 
the EU from affected countries. In 2011, a real-time simulation exercise on African swine fever 
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took  place jointly with the Nordic and Baltic countries including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden (OIE, 2011). In 2012, a further simulation 
exercise took place in Denmark, Spain, the Czech Republic, Belarus and Croatia to plan for an 
eventual outbreak.  
Studies by the FAO in Russia indicate that swill feeding is responsible for 97% of all new 
infections in domestic pigs. It tends to be small-holder farms with few or non-existent 
biosecurity measures that are typically infected first before subsequently passing the virus on to 
small commercial farms and eventually industrial farms (FAO, 2012). Upholding bans on 
swill-feeding to pigs (which is already banned in the EU), could prevent disease transmission 
in Russia and Eastern Europe, but may be difficult to enforce to poor small-holder farmers. The 
main risk factors in the spread of ASF include high proportion of backyard pig farms, wild boar 
contact, illegal trade, and the practice of swill feeding. The EU member states mainly have high 
biosecurity commercial pig farms, bans on swill feeding as well as import restrictions and 
contingency plans, all of which will hopefully safeguard against a spread to the EU. 
Epidemiology and disease transmission 
Warthogs 
The main reservoir of ASF in the wild is the warthog (Phacochoerus africanus). Warthogs live 
over a wide range in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, and are more widespread and numerous than 
bushpigs, who also carry the disease. The transmission of ASF between warthogs follows a 
sylvatic cycle where the ticks of the genus O. moubata act as a vector. Young warthogs become 
infected in their burrows when ticks feed on them. After a short period of viraemia lasting two 
or three weeks, the warthogs recover and show no further clinical symptoms (Costard et. al, 
2009). Animals remain infected for life, with low levels of virus latent in the lymph nodes of 
the head. Adults do not tend to contract the disease from either ticks or direct contact, and 
experimentally transmission through horizontal or vertical contact between individuals has not 
been found. For the disease to spread from warthog to domestic pig, there must therefore be a 
tick vector acting as a go-between. The disease can spread to domestic pigs if they come into 
contact with the vector either by frequenting warthog burrows, or from ticks being carried to 
areas inhabited by domestic pigs (Bastos et. al, 2009). 
Warthogs show a seroprevalence that is consistently around 80% in areas where tick vectors 
are present (Plowright et. al, 1994). There can be a significant variation in prevalence of ASF 
antibodies between different regions, which is largely unexplained. For example, in a study the 
seroprevalence of ASF among warthogs in the Serengeti was found to be 100%, whereas the 
seroprevalence in the neighbouring Magadi region was only 50% (Heuschele and Coggins 
1969). In South Africa even greater variation has been found, with a difference between a 
seroprevalence of 90% and 4% in very close geographical locations (Penrith et. al, 2004). The 
presence of antibodies in adult warthogs is the result of infection as a juvenile, as antibodies 
persist through the entire life of the warthog. The transmission dynamics are complicated and 
incompletely understood, as high seroprevalences have been found in areas of Kenya where no 
Argasid ticks are found.  
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Ticks 
The soft ticks (Argasidae) that are responsible for spreading ASF have a different life cycle 
from hard ticks (Ixodidae) in that they inhabit burrows, pig sties or other areas that are 
frequently visited by their mammalian hosts, but are restricted to one location. This is in 
contrast with hard ticks, that are widely distributed in the environment. As soft ticks have a 
limited distance over which they travel, the range over which they may spread disease is 
likewise limited. Yet if carried on the bodies of their warthog hosts, the ticks may be 
transported from wild to domestic areas and thereby initiate outbreaks in domestic pigs (Bastos 
et. al, 2009). This is dependent on co-habitation with warthogs in areas inhabited by people and 
their animals.  
Infected ticks play an important role in the long-term maintenance of disease in a geographical 
area. They may survive in a burrow for several months and up to several years after feeding on 
an infected host (Oleaga-Pérez et. al, 1990). The virus may even be transmitted through 
transstadial and sexual transmission between ticks (Endris et. al, 1994). This allows the virus to 
persist for a long period of time even without a mammalian host on which to feed. For these 
reasons, it is necessary to eradicate all disease-carrying ticks if in an endemically infected area 
is to become disease-free. Efforts to achieve tick control on a large scale have been fruitless, 
due to their long life, resistance to fasting, the possibility of alternative hosts to pigs, and their 
ability to hide in fissures in buildings to avoid insecticides. This has lead to a great difficulty in 
eradicating ASF from endemic areas where a sylvatic cycle is present (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et. al, 
2009). An alternative has been proposed through inoculating pigs with avermectins to protect 
against ticks, but as yet no vaccine against ticks exists. 
Bushpigs 
Bushpigs may also infect soft ticks, but unlike warthogs, are even capable of infecting domestic 
pigs through direct contact (Bastos et. al, 2009). After infection, bushpigs remain viraemic for a 
period of 35 to 91 days, during which they are capable of spreading the disease to the tick 
vectors (Anderson et. al, 1998). The virus also persists in lymphatic tissue for up to 34 weeks, 
during which time they may infect pigs through direct contact (Anderson et. al, 1998). Similar 
studies have shown that reverse infection of bushpigs from domestic pigs does not occur. As 
bushpigs live predominantly nocturnal lives, they are able to frequent agricultural areas and are 
therefore more likely than warthogs to come into contact with domestic pigs. The frequency of 
infection in bushpigs may be lower than warthogs however, as they do not live in burrows and 
therefore are less likely to come into contact with disease-carrying ticks. This may reduce the 
frequency with which bushpigs become infected, and thereby reduce their importance as a 
wildlife reservoir (Anderson et. al, 1998). However, outbreaks of ASF have occurred in areas 
of Malawi were warthogs and soft ticks are absent, thereby implicating bushpigs in the spread 
of the disease to domestic pigs. 
A suspected hybridization between bushpigs and domestic pigs has been reported, with 
sightings of male bushpigs mounting free-ranging female pigs (Vercammen et al. 1993). This 
may add to the complexity of disease transmission dynamics, as the susceptibility of these 
hybrids to infection and their roles as disease carriers are yet to be elucidated. As bushpigs are 
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a known to be asymptomatic carries, potential hybrids could become asymptomatic carrier pigs 
that spread the disease to other individuals. 
Giant forest hog and wild boar 
There is little data about infection with ASF in the giant forest hog, but it is most likely a rarity 
and has a negligible effect on the spread of the disease (Penrith et al., 2004). Since the 
distribution of this species is restricted to areas of dense forest, contact with domestic pigs is 
unlikely. 
Wild boar are susceptible to ASF and can become infected through direct contact or ingestion 
of infected meat products (Costard et. al, 2009). They exhibit similar clinical signs and have 
very high mortality levels, on a similar scale to domestic pigs. This probably limits their role as 
disease carriers, as the animals die before they have a chance to spread the disease onwards. 
Wild boar are also sedentary animals that do not migrate over large distances. This also limits 
the risk of cross-boundary spread. In areas where large wild boar populations have been present 
during ASF outbreaks, such as in Spain and Sardinia, only low seroprevalence in wild boar 
populations have been found. Their roles as reservoirs in the wild depend on re-infection from 
infected domestic pigs, without which the disease in wild boar will eventually die out (Mur et. 
al, 2012). This suggests that wild boar may only be of limited importance in maintaining the 
disease in the long-term (Mur et. al. 2012, Blome et. al. 2012), which should limit their role in 
the current outbreak in Russia and Eastern Europe. 
Domestic pigs 
ASF can spread in an independent cycle within pig populations, without coming into contact 
with ticks or wild suids. Domestic pigs can transmit the disease through direct contact with 
other pigs for up to one month after infection (Costard et. al, 2009). Transmission via direct 
contact is the most common form of transmission in much of West Africa, where the sylvatic 
cycle has not been demonstrated (Costard et. al, 2009). Even in endemic areas, such as Uganda, 
there is evidence that the most common source of infection is from other domestic pigs and not 
directly from wildlife. The initial source of an outbreak in an area otherwise free of ASF will 
most usually originate from wildlife, and the subsequent spread within the domestic pig 
population will be between infected individuals. However, studies show that the overall 
seroprevalence of the disease in periods between outbreaks is low. In a study in Tanzania, the 
seroprevalence in the domestic pig population was only 7% (Swai et al., 2004).  
In countries such as Senegal, where the role of ticks in disease transmission to domestic pigs is 
limited (Vial et al., 2007), it is likely that trade in animals and animal products, or chronically 
infected pigs are main sources of new outbreaks. Pork products are often implicated, as the 
virus can persist in carcasses for several months. Another line of infection may be through pigs 
feeding on remnants of warthog or bushpig carcasses, as the trade in bushmeat brings meat 
from wild animals to inhabited areas. However, there exists no experimental data to support 
that pigs can become infected by ingestion of warthog tissues (Penrith et. al, 2004). As infected 
bushpigs have higher levels of circulating virus, it is more likely that these could spread the 
disease onwards if consumed. Another hypothesis is that pigs may consume infected ticks on 
the bodies of warthogs, and thereby ingest enough viral particles to become infected. 
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ASF in Uganda 
African swine fever is endemic in Uganda, with regular outbreaks occurring in different parts 
of the country every year. Pig production in Uganda is predominantly conducted by rural 
small-holder farmers, who own on average five pigs per farm. Death rates amongst pigs are 
high, with between 2 and 12 pigs dying per household in 2002 (Doble, 2007). Of these the 
chief cause of death was found to be African swine fever followed by accidents and other 
diseases. Large scale commercial farming exists in some parts of Uganda, but was not the focus 
of this study. In a 2010 census, there were 2.3 million pigs in the country and the population is 
steadily growing, representing an important source of income for a large proportion of rural 
people (FAO, 2010).  
In most cases the pigs on smallholder farms are kept free-ranging or tethered to trees. In some 
cases the pigs are permanently kept in stalls, or kept in stalls overnight and free-ranging during 
the day. It is the extensive nature of pig farming in Uganda that allows pigs to come into 
contact with wildlife and thereby contract ASF. The absence of any biosecurity measures on 
the farms, or proper control programs once a disease outbreak has occurred, is a continuing 
problem and allows the disease to spread uncontrollably once an outbreak has begun. The loss 
of one or all of a farmer’s pigs has serious implications to a farmer, as they are commonly poor 
and live on subsistence farming.  
It is common practice that once an outbreak occurs, farmers try to sell or slaughter their sick 
animals. This increases the likelihood that the disease will spread further, as both live animals 
and meat products brought to market are contagious. Knowledge about the disease and the 
routes of infection are lacking, and better education programs at the local level are required. 
For example, a recent survey of 181 pig farmers in Kampala found that 29% of farmers 
vaccinated their pigs. Of these 25% did not know what disease they vaccinated them against 
and the remaining 75% believed they were vaccinating against ASF (Doble, 2007). This 
despite the fact that there is no current vaccine available against ASF. The same study found 
that the most common course of action if a pig contracted ASF was to send it to the butcher for 
human consumption. Other measures included injecting it with oxytetracycline (an anti-
parasitic that has no effect on the disease), feeding it plants, local herbs, fish or tobacco, or if 
possible selling it to another farmer. The least common course of action was to slaughter the 
animal and disposing of the carcass in a sanitary way (Doble, 2007). 
Control and Prevention of ASF 
To combat ASF control and surveillance policies need to act on the locally where outbreaks 
occur, at the regional level where the disease is endemic, and internationally through 
regulations in trade of animals and animal products. The World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE) has set out international standards and regulations for the trade in livestock. 
Given the ability for the disease to persist for long period in animal by-products, strict 
regulations in trade in pork products need to be followed. Many of the past outbreaks of the 
disease (Portugal 1957, Georgia 2007) have been traced to international movement and careless 
handling of pig meat. 
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Risk assessment is required for all countries currently free of the virus, to establish which 
pathways are high-risk for bringing the disease into the country. This facilitates more targeted 
control and surveillance strategies at the national level. Once spread of ASF has been 
confirmed, the method of eradication is through stamping out of all pigs within the affected 
area and the establishment of a security zone. In endemic areas eradication is more difficult to 
achieve, as the disease has become rooted in a wildlife reservoir and within the domestic pig 
population via chronic carriers. In 2005, the European Commission set out an eradication plan 
for Sardinia to rid the island of the disease. The plan included increased surveillance, improved 
biosecurity measures, a strategy to contain the wild boar population, and stricter regulations 
against export of pig meat products (European Commission, 2005). The plan has had positive 
results, with a declining prevalence in both wild boar and domestic population. Yet total 
eradication has not been achieved. In 2012 a total of 37 outbreaks were confirmed in domestic 
pigs and 23 outbreaks among wild boar (Standing Committee, 2012). This is an increase from 
30 outbreaks in 2011, which points to a failure of the current eradication plans. 
In South Africa, successful control measures have been implemented in the form of ASF free 
zones. Transport of pigs, warthogs and animal products between infected and non-infected 
zones is controlled by permits. In infected areas, commercial pig production is only allowed in 
special enclosures behind double-fence barriers and other biosecurity as set out by the OIE 
(Costard et. al, 2009). The program appears to be successful, with very few outbreaks of ASF 
in commercial farms. Free-ranging pig production does occur, but is discouraged in endemic 
areas because of the high risk of spreading the disease. The success of the program has to be 
seen in light of the large financial cost it requires, making it the reserve of large-scale 
commercial farming and not a feasible option for small-holder subsistence farmers in Africa.  
Objectives of this study 
Investigating the presence of ASF in wildlife and domestic hosts in Uganda as well as 
comparing the genotypes of the virus will indicate whether ASF spreads between wildlife and 
domestic pigs. Research into the spatial distribution of the diseases will indicate whether the 
proximity to wildlife increases the incidence of virus transmission. A better understanding of 
the variety of human and animal interfaces and wildlife-livestock interactions also will give a 
better understanding of how to reduce the spread of the virus. Thereby the study of disease 
transmission dynamics between wild and domestic pigs will act as a model of emerging 
infectious diseases originating in wildlife populations.  
 
In summary, the study aims to: 
 
1. Gain insights into the epidemiology and transmission dynamics of viruses between wild 
and domestic animals, with the transmission of ASF between warthog, bushpig, ticks 
and domestic pigs acting as a model for this process. 
2. Study the prevalence of ASF in domestic pigs in Gulu and Nwoya Districts in northern 
Uganda. 
3. Analyse the husbandry techniques of smallholder farmers and how it affects 
susceptibility to disease. 
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The Study Area 
The study area is within Gulu and Nwoya districts in northern Uganda (fig. 4). This area has 
traditionally suffered from poverty and underdevelopment, with a prevalence of HIV that is 
higher than the rest of the country (WHO 2005). The area has also been affected by the 
intermittent conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Ugandan government 
forces that took place between 1987 and 2005. The region has only begun to be re-populated in 
the last 3 to 5 years, as internal refugees have begun returning to their homes. This brings 
people back into areas that had been reclaimed by wildlife during the years of war, and creates 
a new interface betweeen domestic and wild animals that may facilitate disease transmission. 
Blood samples from domestic pigs were collected from homesteads along the border with 
Murchinson fall national park. The study location was chosen based on its proximity to the 
park as this presents a potential interface zone where free-ranging pigs can come into contact 
with warthogs, bushpigs and infected ticks. In addition to domestic pig samples, the intention 
was to collect blood samples from warthogs and bushpigs inside Murchinson falls national 
park. Due to problems with the seasonally high grass, no warthogs or bushpigs were captured. 
Ticks were collected from warthog burrows inside the park. GPS coordinates were registered 
for each of the sampling locations for domestic pigs, tick and bushpigs (fig. 4). 
Figure 4. Map of Study Area: Gulu and Nwoya Districts. Marked are GPS-coordinates of each of the domestic pig, 
bushpig, and tick samples. The area marked in beige is Murchinson Falls NP. 
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METHOD AND MATERIALS 
Interviews 
At each of the homesteads visited, a short questionnaire was used to answer basic questions 
about the health status, feeding practices and husbandry of the pigs, as well as the presence of 
warthogs and bushpigs in the area. The farmers were also asked if there were any recent 
outbreaks of ASF in or near their village. The interviews were conducted with the aid of the 
district veterinary officer (DVO) (fig. 5). 
Sampling domestic pigs  
Blood samples were collected from domestic pigs in smallholder farms along the border with 
Murchinson Falls National Park (fig. 6). The farms were selected for their proximity to the park 
and a total of 30 homesteads were visited. An average of 3 pigs were sampled per location, 
with a variation from just one pig for the smaller farms up to 11 pigs for the larger farms. 
Samples were collected during a period of 7 days, with a total of 91 blood samples taken. In 
order to gain access to the farms we worked with the local DVO who introduced us to farmers 
willing to take part in the study. As a courtesy to the farmers taking part in the study, the pigs 
that were sampled were dewormed free of charge. 
Blood was sampled from the jugular vein in serum and EDTA vacutainers. Sex, breed (local, 
mixed, improved) and an estimated age were taken for each of the sampled pigs. In addition, 
the pigs were given ear notches in order that they may be identified if one were to be found 
positive for ASF. The serum samples were allowed to settle, and the supernatant transferred to 
a collecting tube, after which it was transported to the Molecular Biology laboratory in 
Makerere University, Kampala. As recommended, the samples were stored at a temperature of 
-20°C while used for analysis in the lab, and transferred to -80°C for long-term storage. 
    
Figure 6. Taking a blood sample with a serum vacutainer, Nwoya district, Uganda 2012.                                           
Figure 5. Interviewing a local pig farmer with the assistance of the DVO, Nwoya district, Uganda 2012.      
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Sampling bushpigs, warthogs, and ticks 
Attempts were made to capture warthogs in the northern sections of Murchinson Falls national 
park. This area was close to where the domestic pigs had been sampled, and was therefore of 
interest as a wildlife interface. When warthogs were sighted, game capture nets measuring 100 
meters in length were erected and the warthogs herded toward the nets. The efforts were 
hampered by the seasonally high grass, as the field research was carried out during the rainy 
season. For this reason as well as logistical constraints on the ground, no warthogs were 
captured. Bushpigs were captured as part of a different study between the Swedish University 
of Agricultural Studies (SLU) and Makerere University. The bushpigs were captured using the 
same technique during the dry season of July and August, when the grass is lower and the 
bushpigs more easily sighted. Ticks were collected from a total of six warthog burrows in the 
study area. Only engorged ticks were collected, as these were most likely to contain blood from 
warthogs living in the burrows (fig. 7). 
      
Figure 7. Collecting ticks from warthog burrows, Murchinson Falls National Park, Uganda 2012. 
Laboratory analyses 
The samples from domestic pigs and ticks were analysed at the Molecular Biology laboratory 
at Makerere University Institute of Natural Resources. DNA was extracted using GeneJet 
Whole Blood Genomic DNA Purification Mini Kit (Thermo Scientific, Waltham, USA), using 
the Whole Blood Main Protocol for extraction of blood samples from both domestic pigs and 
the blood retrieved from engorged ticks. In order to achieve a higher concentration of viral 
DNA, the samples were eluted to 60μl and not 200μl as recommended by the protocol. 
PCR 
Blood samples 
The samples were pooled farm-wise with no more than 3 samples from each farm and run in a 
real-time PCR using assay from Tetracore (ASFV PCR Assay, Tetracore). The viral assay is a 
real-time PCR method that utilizes a specific set of forward and reverse primers for the 
detection of ASF viral DNA. The PCR amplifies a section of the gene coding for a structural 
viral protein 72 (VP72) in the ASF virus. The p72 protein (B646L gene) is the main component 
of the viral capsid that surrounds the inner virus envelope. It makes up about 32% of the total 
protein mass and has a high antigenicity (Bastos et. al, 2003).  
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Each Smartcycler tube was loaded with 22.5μl Rehydration Buffer and 2.5μl of extracted 
material (sample) or 2.5μl ASF positive control (provided by Tetracore), or 2.5μl distilled 
water as a negative control. Each tube was then briefly centrifuged in a microfuge before being 
loaded into the PCR Smartcycler (Cepheid Inc., Sunnyvale, Calif). The cycling conditions, as 
set out by Tetracore, were 1 denaturation cycle at 95°C for 120s, followed by an amplification 
of the DNA strands with 1 cycle at 95°C for 5s, and one cycle at 60°C for 60s. Steps two and 
three were repeated 45 times. A positive sample results in a sigmoid curve, with a lower Ct 
(cycle threshold) corresponding to higher concentrations of viral DNA in the sample (fig. 8). 
 
Figure 8. RT-PCR results from domestic pigs in Nwoya district. The sigmoid curves represent positive control 
(blue) and positive DPE2 sample (red). 
Samples that were positive in the real-time PCR were run on a classic PCR using two 
oligonucleotide primers termed P72-U (5’ GGCACAAGTTCGGACATGT 3’) and P72-D (5’ 
GTACTGTAACGCAGCACAG 3’) amplifying a region of 478 bp at the C-terminal end of the 
p72 protein (Bastos et. al, 2003). Genomic amplification was performed in a 50μl volume in 
the presence of 0.2mM dNTP, 2.5μl of each primer, 1μl Pfu polymerase and 2μl of DNA 
extract. The eluted material was then run in a Mastercycler PCR. Amplification products of the 
expected 478 bp size run on a 2% agarose gel electrophoresis and identified against a 
molecular weight marker. When the electrophoresis was performed, no viral DNA was 
detected. Therefore a Touchdown PCR was used to avoid amplifying nonspecific DNA 
sequences. This is achieved by using higher annealing temperatures, thereby increasing the 
specificity of the primers (table 1). Higher specificity avoids unwanted binding by the primers, 
which leads to amplification of the wrong segments of DNA, thereby obscuring the 
amplification of the desired segments. The earliest steps of the PCR reaction are run at the 
highest possible temperature below the melting point of the primers. At this temperature the 
primers will bind with the highest specificity. At each of the following rounds the temperature 
is decreased, and the desired fragments are amplified. 
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PCR Conditions 
Classic PCR Pfu protocol Touchdown PCR 
Step 1 95◦C 7min   Step 1 95◦C 7 min   
Step 2 95◦C 30 sec 
x35 
Step 2 95◦C 30 sec 
x10 Step 3 55◦C 30 sec Step 3 65◦C 15 sec 
Step 4 72◦C 30 sec Step 4 72◦C 30 sec 
Step 5 72◦C 10 min   Step 5 95◦C 30 sec 
x35 
  
Step 6  56◦C 30 sec 
Step 7 72◦C 30 sec 
Step 8 72◦C 10 min   
Table 1. Mastercycler PCR temperature conditions for each step of the 
classic PCR Pfu protocol and Toudown PCR with higher annealing 
temperatures. 
Blood extracted from Ornithodoros ticks 
Blood was removed from the ticks using a scalpel and pipette. Some ticks had already digested 
the blood, and could therefore not be used. The viral DNA was extracted using the Thermo 
Scientific Whole Blood Protocol as above. The samples were then run in the same real-time 
PCR Smartcycler from Cepheid using the kit and cycling conditions from Tetracore. 
Tick tissue (whole ticks) 
ASFV can be found both in the blood the tick has consumed, but also in the salivary glands, 
coxal glands, reproductive tissue and midgut epithelium of the ticks themselves (Kleiboker, 
1998). For this reason, it is useful to analyze the tick tissue for presence of ASFV. The whole 
ticks were ground down using a sterile mortar and pestle. First a dry homogenization was 
carried out, after which 600μl PBS was added and the homogenization continued until the ticks 
were well separated. The solution was then centrifuged in a low speed centrifugation at 
4000rpm for 10 minutes to allow the debris to settle and the supernatant to surface. The 
supernatant was then siphoned off for use in DNA extraction using the Thermo Scientific 
Whole Blood Protocol. 
When the extracted material was run in a gel electrophoresis, no bands of extracted DNA were 
found. Efforts were made to adjust the extraction method to retrieve the ASFV DNA. The 
Thermo Scientific Tissue Protocol was used and the incubation period, which was 10 min at 
56°C according to the Tissue Protocol, was extended to 30 min, 60 min, and 12h to give the 
Digestion Solution and Proteinase K longer time to take effect. Neither the Blood Protocol, 
Tissue Protocol or extended incubation times had any effect, and none of the subsequent gels 
showed any evidence of extracted DNA. Therefore the attempts at analyzing tick tissue were 
abandoned.  
Purification and sequencing 
Samples positive for ASFV were run in a Touchdown PCR as described above, and the DNA 
products purified using the QIAquick PCR purification kit from QIAGEN. The buffers 
provided in the kit recover the desired DNA and removes contaminants such as impurities, 
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salts, enzymes, and unincorporated nucleotides. The DNA binds to the silica membrane in the 
spin column while contaminants pass through the column. As the impurities are washed away, 
the pure DNA is refined and eluted with 50μl Buffer EB. The purified DNA products were then 
sent to Macrogen in Amsterdam for sequencing. 
The sequences were assembled and edited using Seqman Lasergene9 from DNAstar. The 
sequences where aligned using BioEdit Sequence alignment software. A phylogenetic 
neighbour-joining tree was constructed, using MEGA5 with a bootstrap value of 1000 (fig. 9). 
ELISA 
To detect antibodies against ASFV, the positive sample (DPE2) and samples from nearby 
farms were run in a commercial blocking ELISA kit from Ingenasa (INGEZIM PPA 
COMPAC, Ingenasa, Spain). All reagents as well as positive and negative controls were 
provided in the kit. The wells are coated with VP73 protein extract, which is a protein antigen 
of the ASF virus. If the sample contains ASF antibodies, it will bind to the antigen coating in 
the wells. 
The sample was diluted 1:1 with 50μl serum sample and  50μl diluent. The same procedure was 
used for the positive and negative control. The samples were incubated for one hour, and then 
washed four times using 300μl washing solution. After this 100μl conjugate was added and the 
samples incubated for 30 min at 37◦C. The samples were then washed five times, after which 
100μl substrate solution was added to each well. Finally 100μl stop solution was added to each 
well, and the optical density (OD) values measured at 450nm. The viability was determined if 
the relationship between negative control (NC) and positive control (PC) was NC/PC ≥ 4. 
According to this formula all tests were determined to be viable. The formulas for the positive 
and negative cut-offs were:  
Positive cut off: NC – ((NC-PC) x 0.5)  
Negative cut off: NC – ((NC-PC) x 0.4)  
The sample was considered positive if the OD was smaller than the positive cut-off and 
negative if the OD was greater than the negative cut-off.  
RESULTS 
Blood samples 
Of the 91 domestic pigs sampled in Gulu and Nwoya districts, one was found to be PCR 
positive for ASFV (fig. 8). The Ct value was 34.4, indicating a positive reaction with moderate 
amounts of target nucleic acid in the sample. When the sample was run through an ELISA, no 
antibodies for ASFV were found. 
All the blood samples extracted from ticks were PCR negative for ASFV. 
Sequencing 
Nucleotide Blast analysis confirmed 100% relationship with ASFV p72 nucleotide sequences 
from Uganda. In the phylogenetic tree the positive ASFV sample from this study (id:DPE2) 
21 
was used along with strains of ASFV from other parts of Africa and the outbreak in Georgia in 
2007 (fig. 9). 
 
Figure 9. Phylogenetic tree of ASFV p72 nucleotide sequences from several African and European outbreaks. 
Accession numbers are displayed, followed by the country of origin and the genotype of each strain in roman 
numerals. The positive sample from this study, DPE2, is labelled. 
Questionnaire 
A total of 31 farmers were interviewed for this study. Of these, the majority owned between 
one and four pigs (65%). The husbandry was fairly evenly divided between free-ranging, 
keeping the pigs in stalls, and having them tethered outdoors. The breed of the pigs was in most 
cases (87%) of the local variety, with only a few having improved or mixed breeds. Two thirds 
of the farmers found their pigs to be generally healthy, with none specifying their pigs as being 
infected with ASF. Nine of the farmers were aware of there being warthogs and bushpigs in 
their local area, and eight farmers were aware of outbreaks of ASF having occurred in or near 
their village.  
Discussion 
This study did not find any infected wild suids or tick vectors. The blood extracted from the 
ornithodoros ticks that were collected from warthog burrows were all PCR negative for the 
virus. If the ticks had fed on warthogs, which is likely given their origin, these would by 
extension also be negative for the virus. The find of one PCR positive pig confirms that the 
virus is circulating among the domestic pig population in northern Uganda. The PCR positive 
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pig showed no adverse clinical signs when sampled and was negative for ASFV antibodies. 
This could be because it has very recently been infected and had not time to develop clinical 
symptoms, or had survived the disease and was in recovery. The lack of antibodies could be 
explained by an insufficient immune response, or a low-virulent strain of the virus inducing a 
weak reaction. Another possibility is that the sample was contaminated in the laboratory, but 
this was judged to be unlikely as all sanitary steps were followed. When the owner of the 
infected pig was interviewed, it was confirmed that a recent outbreak of ASF had occurred in 
the neighboring village, but the owner claimed that the sampled pig was healthy. The owner 
also had a few smaller piglets and claimed these were not in good health, but it was not clear 
what they were suffering from. These piglets were too small to be sampled for this study. 
The presence of virus but lack of antibodies is an interesting find, and could suggest the 
presence of subclinically infected pigs that could potentially harbor the disease. The presence 
of asymptomatic carriers means that screening for the virus in an area would require both PCR 
analysis and ELISA, as a lack of antibodies does not rule out infection.  
When genotyped, the virus was found to belong to genotype IX, which is one of many 
genotypes previously identified in Uganda. Historically, all ASFV p72 genotypes (22 in total) 
have been circulating in eastern and southern Africa, and genotype I has been circulating in 
Europe, South America, the Caribbean and West Africa. The outbreak in Georgia in 2007 was 
of genotype II (GenBank accession no. FR682468), which marks a spread of the disease from 
its natural boundaries on the African continent. This highly virulent strain clustered with ASFV 
isolates from Mozambique, Zambia, and Madagascar and was 100% identical to a strain of p72 
genotype II that caused an outbreak in Tanzania between 2010-2012 (GenBank accession 
nr.JX391987 [TAN/10/Kyela]) (Misinzo et. al, 2012). 
This study cannot confirm that ASF is spread from wildlife to domestic pigs in northern 
Uganda, as there is insufficient evidence to support such a hypothesis. To confirm such a 
theory, larger volumes of data and the sampling of bushpigs, warthogs, ticks and domestic pigs 
would be required. However, this study can confirm that the conditions are in place for wildlife 
to livestock transmission to occur, as several farmers kept free-ranging pigs and had seen 
warthogs and bushpigs near their farms. This is a clear indication of the possibility of a 
wildlife-domestic interface. The literature on the epidemiology of ASF supports the transfer of 
virus from wild to domestic pigs, but the exact nature of the transmission between vector and 
host in Uganda is yet to be established. The respective roles of bushpigs, warthogs, ticks and 
asymptomatic domestic carriers in causing outbreaks needs to be identified for a 
comprehensive understanding of how to combat the disease. 
The role of the bushpig in maintaining and spreading the disease in Uganda is one of the main 
lines of research on this topic. Bushpigs can under experimental conditions infect domestic 
pigs, but to what extent this happens in the wild in not yet known. This study can not arrive at 
any conclusions about the potential roles of bushpigs in disease transmission, but from the 
locations where bushpigs were captured, it is clear that bushpigs do at least occasionally stray into 
inhabited areas. GPS tracking of bushpigs to confirm the extent they stray into inhabited areas 
would be useful, as would be tracking free ranging domestic pigs to see how far they stray into 
adjoining lands. It would also be interesting to perform virus isolation and sequence analysis on 
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positive samples from bushpigs and warthogs, and comparing these with virus strains in domestic 
pigs to see if the same virus appears in all species. If so, it would support the hypothesis that the 
virus spreads between them. 
A key to future control of the virus is the development of a vaccine. There is currently no 
vaccine available against ASF, but research indicates that developing a vaccine should be 
feasible (Lewis et. al, 2000). The live-attenuated, inactivated or recombinant vaccines that have 
been developed so-far have been unsuccessful. This is thought to be the result of the lack of 
effective antibodies to ASFV and the great variability of the virus. An attenuated vaccine may 
be found using low-virulence strains of the virus or by deletion of disease-causing genes could 
weaken the virus. Another approach may be to study viral interactions in macrophages, and 
thereby stimulate a protective immune response (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et. al, 2009). The 
ineffectiveness of the antibody response despite high levels of antibodies produced during 
acute ASF infections points to a role for cellular immunity. The promotion of natural killer 
cells (NK) and cytotoxicity of leucocytes may have an effect on the progression of the disease 
(Sánchez-Vizcaíno et. al, 2009).  
Until a vaccine has been developed, the best method for disease control is the physical 
separation of domestic pigs from wildlife. Practical experiences from other endemic areas show 
that this can have a great effect. In Uganda this would be difficult to implement, as the farmers 
tend to be poor and lack the means to build proper housing for their animals. There also 
appeared to be a lack of motivation among farmers to deal with the disease and similarly a lack 
of motivation among the DVO, who appeared resigned to a cycle of disease outbreaks in the 
area. In addition, the veterinary officers most probably lack the resources required to properly 
control an outbreak when it does occur. The roads in the villages are notoriously bad, 
especially in the rainy season, which creates practical difficulties in reaching areas where 
outbreaks occur. 
Conclusion 
The many potential modes of transmission in Uganda (trade, slaughter, asymptomatic carriers, 
bushmeat, wildlife-livestock interface) suggests that any control measures against the disease 
have to be broad to encompass all routes of infection. The most important step in this regard is 
education programs at the community level, to inform farmers of the disease and how it 
spreads. The farmers must also be given incentives not to try to slaughter and sell the meat 
once a pig becomes sick, nor selling the live animal once it contracts the disease. Farmers must 
also be taught the clinical symptoms of the disease, to allow for a quicker response to contain 
an eventual outbreak.  
Of fundamental importance is government funding of proper disease surveillance and control 
programs, as well as proper compensation schemes to increase farmer compliance. This is a 
challenge in Uganda, where veterinary services lack resources and government compensation is 
non-existent. The feasibility of ASF-free zones has been demonstrated in South Africa, and 
may act as a model for other African nations where ASF is endemic.  
Further research will be required to confirm the main mode of disease transmission from 
wildlife in northern Uganda, and thereby identify the source of new outbreaks. 
24 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisors Anne-Lie Blomström and Dr Karl Ståhl for their great 
support and help throughout this project. Special thanks to Dr Charles Masembe for his 
friendly support in the lab and during field work in Uganda, without which this project would 
not have been possible. To Mr Johnson for his creative solutions in the lab, Peter Ogweng and 
Tony Aliro for their expertise in sample collection in the field. A big thank you to Denis 
Muhangi, who very kindly took the time to assist with the ELISA in the final stages of lab 
work. A final thank you to all other enthusiasts who helped with both fieldwork and laboratory 
work, as well as my student colleagues who made the work such fun.  
Sida and Faculty of Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science for funding the project. 
References 
Anderson E.C., Hutchings G.H., Mukarati N., Wilkinson P.J. (1998) African swine fever virus 
infection of the bushpig (Potamochoerus porcus) and its significance in the epidemiology of the 
disease, Veterinary Microbiology 62, pg 1-15 
Barclay, C. (2001) Foot and Mouth Disease, Research paper 01/35, Science and Environment 
section, House of Commons Library. 
Bastos, A., Penrith, M., Crucière, C. (2003) Genotyping field strains of African swine fever 
virus by partiak p72 gene characterisation, Archives of Virology, 148, pg 693-706 
Bastos, D.S., Jori F. (2009) Role of Wild Suids in the Epidemiology of African Swine Fever, 
EcoHealth, correspondence 
Beltrán-Alcrudo, D., Lubroth, J., Depner, K., De La Rocque, S., (2008) African swine fever in 
the Caucasus, Empres Watch Emergency Prevention Systems 
Blome, S., Gabriel, C., Dietze, K., Breithaupt, A., Beer, M. (2012) High Virulence of African 
Swine Fever Virus Caucasus Isolate in European Wild Boars of All Ages, Letter, Emerging 
Infectious Diseases Vol 18, No.4 
Boås, M (2005) Northern Uganda Internally Displaced Persons Profiling Study, UNDP 
(http://www.fafo.no/ais/africa/uganda/IDP_uganda_2005.pdf)  
Callaway, E., (2012) Pig fever sweeps across Russia, Nature 488, pg 565-566  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2012) http://www.cdc.gov/sars/  
Cleaveland, S., Appel, M.G.J., Chalmers, W.S.K., Chillingworth, C., Kaare, M., Dye, C. 
(2000) Serological and demographic evidence for domestic dogs as a source of canine 
distemper virus infection for Serengeti wildlife, Veterinary Microbiology 72, 217-227 
Costard, S., Wieland, B., de Glanville, W., Jori, F., Rowlands, R., Vosloo, W., Roger, F., 
Pfeiffer, D. U. & Dixon, L.K. (2009) African Swine Fever: how can global spread be 
prevented? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 364, 2683-2696  
25 
Daszak, P., Cunningham, A.A., Hyatt, A.D. (2000) Emerging Infectious Diseases of Wildlife: 
Threats to Biodiversity and Human Health, Science 287, 443 
Daszak, P., Cunningham A.A., Hyatt A.D. (2001) Anthropogenic environmental change and 
the emergence of infectious diseases in wildlife, Acta Tropica 78, 103-116 
Daszak P., Plowright, R.K., Epstein, J.H (2006) The emergence of Nipah and Hendra virus: 
pathogen dynamics across a wildlife-livestock-human continuum, Disease Ecology 186-200 
Davis, J.R., Lederberg, J. (2001) Emerging Infectious Diseases from the Global to the Local 
Perspective: Worskshop Summary, Forum on Emerging Infections, Board on Global 
Health.(http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10084)  
Den Hartog, L., (2004) Developments in global pig production, Advances in pig production 15, 
17-24  
Doble, L. (2007) Prioritisation of production and constraints within the Kampala urban and 
peri-urban pig production system: A baseline study, St. George’s University Graduate Studies 
Program, MSc Animal Production 
Endris, R.G., Hess, W.R. (1994) Attempted transovarial and venereal transmission of African 
swine fever virus by the Iberian soft tick Ornithodoros (Pavlovskyella) marocanus (Acari: 
Ixodoidea: Argasidae), J Med Entomol, 31(3), pg 373-381 
European Commission: Official Journal of the European Union (2005), Commission Decision 
approving the plan for the eradication of African swine fever in feral pigs in Sardinia, Italy, 
(2005/362/EC)  
FAO (2010) FAOSTAT (http://faostat3.fao.org/home/index.html)  
FAO (2012) (http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/154778/icode/) 
Hahn., B.H., Shaw, G.M., de Cock, K.M. (2000) AIDS as a Zoonosis: Scientific and Public 
Helath Implications, Science Vol. 287 pg 607-614. 
Heuschele, W.P., Coggins, L., (1969). Epizootiology of African swine fever virus in warthogs, 
Bull Epizoot Dis Afr 17, pg179-183.  
 
Jones, K. E., Patel, N.G., Levy, M. A. (2008) Global trends in emerging infectious diseases, 
Nature, Vol 451, pg 990-994 
Kleiboeker, S.B., Burrage, T.G., Scoles, G.A., Fish, D., Rock, D.L. (1998) African Swine 
Fever Virus Infection in the Argasid Host, Ornithodoros porcinus porcinus, Journal of 
Virology, pg 1711-1724  
Lewis, T., Zsak, L., Burrage, T.G., Lu, Z., (2000) An African Swine Fever Virus ERV1-ALR 
Homologure, 9GL, Affects Viral Growth in Macrophages and Viral Virulence in Swine, 
Journal of Virology, Vol 74, no 3, pg 1275-1285 
26 
Misinzo, G., Kasanga, C.J., Mpelumbe-Ngeleja, C., Masambu, J. (2012) Letter: African Swine 
Fever Virus, Tanzania 2010-2012, Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, vol. 18, nr 12 
Morse, S.S., (1995) Factors in the Emergence of Infectious Diseases, Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, Vol 1, nr 1, pg 7-16 
Mur, L., Boadella, M., Martínez-López, B., Gallardo, C., Gortazar, C. & Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 
J.M. (2012) Monitoring of African swine fever in the wild boar population of the most recent 
endemic area of Spain. Transboundary and emerging diseases, Vol.1-6.29  
OIE – World Organisation for Animal Health. Home page (2011) Simulation exercise: African 
swine fever in Denmark, including the other Nordic and Baltic countries, Animal Health 
Information Department 
OIE – World Organisation for Animal Health. Home page. [online] OIE Technical disease 
card. African swine fever. (2009) Available from: 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/AFRICAN_S
WINE_FEVER_FINAL.pdf [2012-02-09]  
Oleaga-Pérez, A., Pérez-Sánchez, R., Encinas-Grandes, A. (1990) Distribution and biology of 
Ornithodoros erraticus in parts of Spain affected by African swine fever, Veterinary Record, 
126 (2) pg 32-37 
Olupot, W., McNeilage, A.J., Plumptre, A.J., (2009) An anlaysis of socioeconomics of 
bushmeat hunting at major hunting sites in Uganda, Working Paper no. 38, Wildlife 
Conservation Society 
Plowright, W., Thomson, G.R., Neser, J.A. (1994) African swine fever, Infectious diseases of 
livestock, with Special reference to southern Africa vol 1, pg 567-599 
Penrith, M-L., Thomson, G.R., Bastos, A.D.S., Phiri, O.C., Lubisi, B.A., Du Plessis, E.C., 
Macome, F., Pinto, F., Botha, B. & Esterhuysen, J. (2004) An investigation into natural 
resistance to African swine fever in domestic pigs from an endemic area in southern Africa. 
Revue scientifique et technique – Office international des épizooties 23 (3), 965-977  
Roberts, H., (2012) African Swine Fever in Ukraine, Preliminary Outbreak Assessment, 
Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Veterinary Science Team, 
International Disease Monitoring 
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, J. M., Martínez-López, B., Martínez-Avilés, et. al (2009) Scientific review 
on African Swine Fever, Scientific report submitted to EFSA 
Smith, K.F., Sax, D.F., Lafferty, K.D., (2006) Evidence for the Role of Infectious Disease in 
Species Extinction and Endangerment, Conservation Biology vol 20, no.5, pg 1349-1357 
Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, (2011) Regione Autonoma della 
Sardegna 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory/scfcah/animal_health/presentations/08091111_
asf_sardinia_italy.pdf). 
27 
Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, (2012) Regione Autonoma della 
Sardegna 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory/scfcah/animal_health/presentations/070805201
2_asf_sardinia_en.pdf) 
Swai, E.S., Mrosso, A., Njau, P., Mbise, A., Kessey, V., Massambu, J. A cross-sectional study 
on African Swine Fever (ASF) in domestic pigs in Northern Tanzania, Bulletin Animal Health 
Production, 53, pg 43-49 
Taylor, L.H., Latham, S.M., Woolhouse, M.E.J. (2001) Risk factors for human disease 
emergence, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 356, 983-989 
Vercammen, P., Seydack, A. H. W., and Oliver, W. L. B., (1993). The Bush Pigs 
(Potamochoerus porcus and P. larvatus,  Pigs, Peccaries and Hippos Status Survey and Action 
Plan  
 
Vial, L., Wieland, B., Jori, F., Etter, E., Dixon, L., Roger, F. (2007) African Swine Fever Virus 
DNA in Soft Ticks, Senegal, Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol 13, no 12 
WAHID Interface, OIE World Animal Health Information Database. Home page [online] 
Disease distribution maps (2010-11-20). Available from: 
http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=home [2012-02-24]  
Webby, R., Hoffmann, E., Webster, R. (2004) Molecular constraints to interspecies 
transmission of viral pathogens, Nature Medicine Supplement, vol 10, no. 12 
WHO (2005) Health and mortality survey among internally displaced persons in Gulu, Kitgum 
and Pader districts, northern Uganda, The Republic of Uganda Ministry of Health 
(http://www.who.int/hac/crises/uga/sitreps/Ugandamortsurvey.pdf)  
Wolfe, N.D., Daszak, P., Kilpatrick, A.M., Burke, D.S. (2005) Bushmeat Hunting, 
Deforestation, and Prediction of Zoonotic Disease Emergence, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 
vol 11, no 12 
Wolfe, N.D., Switzer, W.M., Carr, J.K., Bhullar, V.B (2004) Naturally acquired simian 
retrovirus infection in central African hunters, The Lancet, vol 363, pg 932-937 
Zommers, Z., MacDonald, D.W. (2011) Protected Areas as Frontiers for Human Migration, 
Conservation Biology, vol 26, no 3., pg 547-556 
